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ABSTRACT: We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem.    The intentional 
states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made 
against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective 
must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended pro-
cesses, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her 
choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for 
two-boxing is mistaken.
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strategy; common cause.
RESUMEN: Ofrecemos un argumento novedoso a favor de elegir solo una caja en el Problema de  Newcomb. 
Los estados intencionales de una persona racional son psicológicamente coherente a través del tiempo, y las de-
cisiones están hechas con esta coherencia como trasfondo. Comparamos esta coherencia a través del tiempo con 
un swing de golf que, para ser efectivo, tiene que incluir un buen follow through cuando la bola ya está en el 
aire. Decisiones, como swings de golf, son procesos extendidos, y su coherencia con otros estados psicológicos del 
jugador en el escenario de Newcomb vincula su elección con la predicción hecha sobre ella en una estructura de 
causa común. En consecuencia, el argumento estándar para elegir dos cajas es equivocado.
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1. Introduction
We offer a novel argument for choosing one box in Newcomb’s Problem.1 We begin with 
a brief vignette to present the essential features of Newcomb’s Problem and to make the 
decision context more salient. We present a standard analysis of the problem due to Gib-
bard and Harper (1978) and make explicit some relevant assumptions about the predic-
tor. Our analysis begins by observing that the intentional states of a rational person are 
essentially psychologically coherent and that rational decisions are made against this back-
drop of personal ratio155nality. We elaborate this coherence constraint on rationality 
through an analogy with a golf swing, which to be effective includes a follow-through af-
ter the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coher-
ence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice 
with the way she is predicted. As a result, the standard analysis according to which choos-
ing two boxes is a dominant strategy is mistaken. In fact, that analysis would apply equally 
to someone who was never interviewed by a predictor at all, and simply found herself in 
front of two boxes. We argue that psychological coherence requires certain backtrack-
ing counterfactuals to be true in the scenario stipulated in the Newcomb Problem, which 
entail that choosing one box is the rational decision. In effect, a person’s psychological 
make-up is a common cause of what she will choose and what is in the opaque box, me-
diated via the predictor. Treating decisions as isolated, independent events can, in certain 
circumstances such as the reflexive context of the Newcomb Problem, lead to paradoxes 
about what is rational.
2. Newcomb’s Problem (Vignette)
Host: Let’s welcome our next two contestants on today’s show. Our first contestant is a sin-
gle working parent of three; the second is a graduate student in philosophy. Given your circum-
stances, clearly you both could really use as much money as you can possibly get today.
Contestants 1 and 2 together: Yes, absolutely.
Host: Okay, remember the rules of the game. We have two boxes, A and B. We can all 
see that box B (which is transparent) has $1,000 in it. Opaque Box A may or may not contain 
$1,000,000. You can choose either box A by itself or both boxes. And of course the catch is that 
before coming out on stage, you have each been interviewed by Cassandra, our oracle. Based on 
your interviews, she has predicted whether you will pick one or two boxes. If she predicted you 
will pick two boxes, then box A will be empty; but if she predicted you will pick just box A, it will 
contain the $1,000,000.
<Crowd cheers wildly>
Host: And remember Cassandra is correct in her predications 99% of the time. Contestant 
number 1, this is your big moment. So what are you going to choose?
1 Other proponents of choosing one box include Bar-Hillel and Margalit (1972), Dummett (1993), 
Horgan (1981), Horowich (1985), Price (1986, 1991, 2012), Spohn (2012), and Vinci (1988). 
Ahmed (2014) and Hunter and Richter (1978) find fault with the causal decision theory (CDT) typ-
ically invoked to make the case for choosing two boxes. While we are sympathetic to many of the con-
clusions these authors reach, and argue for some ourselves as noted in the text, only Spohn’s reasoning 
is directly relevant to the argument we present here.
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Contestant 1: Well I really need the money and most of the people who pick one box win 
$1,000,000 so that’s my choice, just box A.
During a dramatic pause, Contestant 2’s classmates scoff at the irrationality of her decision. 
“Why would she leave $1,000 on the table?”2 Just then box A is raised revealing $1,000,000 ac-
companied by flashing lights, sirens, and confetti. As the excitement subsides Contestant 1 leaves 
the stage with her $1,000,000.
Host: Now Contestant 2, you’re a graduate student in philosophy. Did Cassandra ask you 
about that?
Contestant 2: Yes. That was the only question she asked me.
<Host grimaces>
Host: Well, you’ve seen how it’s done. What’s your choice?
Contestant 2: Since $1,000,000 is already either in box A or it’s not and I can’t change that 
now, to get as much money as possible I choose both boxes. Why would I leave $1,000 on the ta-
ble?
Contestant 2’s friends nod approvingly. Box A is raised revealing nothing. Contestant 2 is 
heard mumbling, “Good thing I took both boxes or I’d have gotten nothing” while exiting the 
stage with her $1,000.
3. The Dominant Strategy
Gibbard and Harper (1978) argue that the rational choice in Newcomb’s Problem is to 
choose two boxes because at the time a decision is made what is in the opaque box has al-
ready been determined; the choice is not a cause of what is in the opaque box. Since the ob-
jective is to get as much money as possible, Gibbard and Harper reason that regardless of 
whether the opaque box contains one million dollars or nothing, the payout in each case is 
larger by taking both boxes, making that the rational choice; i.e. choosing two boxes is the 
dominant strategy.
Rational choice in Newcomb’s situation, we maintain, depends on a comparison of what 
would happen if one took both boxes with what would happen if one took only the opaque box. 
What the agent knows for sure is this: if he took both boxes, he would get a thousand dollars 
more than he would if he took only the opaque box. That on our view makes it rational for some-
one who wants as much [money]3 as he can get to take both boxes, and irrational to take only one 
box (Gibbard and Harper 1978, 155).
While this reasoning seems compelling, it nonetheless flies in the face of the stipulated 
facts; the vast majority (99%) of those who choose one box receive $1,000,000 while those 
who choose two boxes do not. As a matter of stipulated fact, those who choose one box re-
ceive more money, the agreed upon objective in the Newcomb scenario. Why would the ra-
tional choice lead to the undesired outcome? We argue pace Gibbard and Harper that the 
rational choice is to choose one box, once rationality is properly understood in this context 
in terms of psychological coherence.
2 This sentiment reflects the dominant strategy (see section 3 below) and is clearly expressed in (Joyce 
1999, 153): “... the ‘If you’re so smart why ain’t you rich?’ defense does nothing to let [the one-boxer] 
off the hook; she made an irrational choice that cost her $1,000.”
3 The original text reads “…as much much as he can get…”
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Gibbard and Harper’s analysis of Newcomb’s Problem, which has become the canon, 
depends essentially on their assumption that a participant’s decision is causally independ-
ent of what is in the opaque box. Only on the assumption of independence does it fol-
low that choosing two boxes is the dominant strategy, i.e. that “What the agent knows for 
sure is this: if he took both boxes, he would get a thousand dollars more than he would if 
he took only the opaque box” (ibid.). David Lewis shares this intuition. “We [two-boxers] 
are convinced by counterfactual conditionals: If I took only one box, I would be poorer by 
a thousand dollars than I will be after taking both” (Lewis 1981, 377). It is this assumption 
we deny. Before turning to our argument we address some preliminary assumptions.
4. About the Predictor
The Newcomb Problem stipulates that there is a highly accurate predictor of a player’s 
choice who determines the contents of opaque box A based on that prediction. In assessing 
what choice is rational for a player in the Newcomb Problem, we do not address how one 
might rationally come to believe that there is such an accurate predictor.4 For our analysis, 
we assume that a player can take the high success rate of the predictor for granted and, fur-
thermore, assume that this stipulated success is not contingent to her actual predictive suc-
cess5, which then might be due to nothing more than lucky guesses. In such a case previous 
predictive successes are no guarantee of continued success and so should not be a factor in 
reasoning about likely outcomes and we agree with the standard analysis that the rational 
choice is to take two boxes. The interesting case is when the predictor’s success is nomic, 
hence counterfactual supporting. The player need not know how the predictor is so success-
ful only that she is almost always correct in her predictions and it is no accident that she is.
Assuming the predictor’s success is not contingent reveals an overlooked way in which 
a player’s rationality is relevant to an analysis of the Newcomb Problem. While we do not 
know how the predictor divines a player’s choice—number of philosophy courses, brain 
scans, or how many children one has—there must be telltale signs as to what the player will 
ultimately choose to which the predictor is sensitive, even if the player herself is unaware 
of those signs and changes her mind several times before the final decision. That is, we take 
the stipulated facts about the predictor’s success as evidence for a causal process leading to 
a player’s decision that the predictor can foresee:6 the very causal process upon which the 
player’s rationality supervenes.7
4 As Bar-Hillel and Margalit (1972) note, intuitions about the Newcomb Problem might be driven in 
part by a general skepticism about the possibility of such a reliable predictor. Interestingly, Nozick 
(1993) reanalyzes conflicting intuitions about what is rational in terms of a decision value that de-
pends in part on confidence in the predictor.
5 We also have nothing to say about a supernatural predictor.
6 It is the causal process that is essential to our analysis. The probability of successful prediction indi-
cates how likely the predictor is to foresee that process, so for our analysis the exact value (99%) does 
not matter.
7 So what of the player’s free will? We take the stipulated facts to be inconsistent with at least certain 
libertarian notions of free will, in particular, the complete independence of a decision from any prior 
event. On such accounts of free will the Newcomb Problem is incoherent (or requires a supernatural 
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5. Rationality and Coherence
Psychological coherence is a hallmark of rationality; indeed, this is something close to a tau-
tology. We speak both of people and behaviour as being rational, but in order of explana-
tion the rationality of a person is primary. A person is rational when her intentional states 
are mostly consistent with each other and with evidence she encounters. Rationality can 
tolerate some local inconsistencies because we are not cognitively closed (i.e. aware of all of 
the entailments of our intentional states) but rational people typically update their beliefs 
in some way so as to eliminate or at least circumscribe contradictions they become aware 
of. On the other hand, evidently inconsistent beliefs or systematic unresponsiveness to evi-
dence are characteristic of irrationality and are often assessed as psychological disorders such 
as schizophrenia, dementia, OCD, etc.8, which in the extreme preclude intentional charac-
terization altogether. The broad consistency of a rational person’s intentional states provides 
the framework by which she can act for reasons, minimally to satisfy her desires given her be-
liefs. Thus, for an action or decision to be rational, reasons for it must cohere with a rational 
person’s set of intentional states. If it fails to so cohere it is irrational for that agent.
Already our analysis reveals that, strictly speaking, a decision in isolation is neither ra-
tional nor irrational. Nonetheless, in many instances the background of intentional states 
with which a decision must cohere can be left implicit, and in those cases we can speak as if 
an isolated decision is rational or irrational without confusion. Most scenarios considered 
in decision theory are like this. After all, the background states are such mundane things as 
believing that the words in the language of communication have their standard meanings, 
that $1,000,000 is more money than $1,000, and desiring to get the biggest payout possi-
ble. However, we argue that Newcomb’s Problem is not such a case; ignoring psychological 
coherence essential for rationality leads to the paradoxical results of standard analyses.
A consequence of psychological coherence is that some intentional states can be reli-
ably predictive of other intentional states and subsequent decisions, without impugning 
an individual’s autonomy (see footnote 7). For example, a person’s political views tend to 
cluster as either liberal or conservative; someone with leftist views is likely to support gun 
registration legislation; someone on the right is likely to oppose state funded abortion. A 
person’s background psychological states, including her beliefs and desires, short and long-
term memory, reasoning abilities, etc. determine not only her space of rational decisions 
but also her dispositions to choose among those possibilities, often making reliable predic-
tion possible even without supposing the fantastic divination powers of the oracle in the 
Newcomb Problem.
predictor). We note the similarities between an extremely reliable predictor impugning free choice and 
scholastic debates about the consistency of human free will with God’s omniscience. (Thanks to Tom 
Lennon for pointing this out.) The Newcomb Problem’s paradox concerning rational decisions is not, 
however, the same as the traditional theological paradox of how to reconcile free will with God’s om-
niscience.  
While issues of free will are clearly relevant to decision theory, further discussion is beyond the scope 
of this paper.
8 We are not suggesting that irrationality is either necessary or sufficient for having a psychological dis-
order, only that they are often correlated in order to highlight the importance of psychological coher-
ence for rationality. (Bortolotti 2013) discusses these relations.
 Christopher Viger, Carl Hoefer, Daniel Viger
412 Theoria, 2019, 34/3, 407-421
Of course, in the Newcomb Problem we are unaware of how a player’s standing psy-
chological states connect with her final decision, so we can’t see how those states cohere 
with any particular decision, as we can with say a cluster of political beliefs. But the pre-
dictor can. To make sense of the stipulations, there must be a causal chain from a player’s 
state at the time of her interview with Cassandra to her final decision. Furthermore, how-
ever that chain is characterized, for her reasoning process to be relevant in determining her 
choice, which it must for the decision to be rational, it must supervene on at least some 
parts of that causal chain such that the supervening psychological states cohere.
6. Our Argument
In order for a participant’s choice to be rational, she must be rational; her intentional states 
must cohere—again the alternative is that they do not cohere, i.e. they do not hang to-
gether by reason. How a person is inclined to choose, given her psychological profile, deter-
mines very reliably both what she will, in fact, do and what is in the opaque box. The coher-
ence constraint on making a rational decision ensures that her choice is not independent 
of her psychological make-up, and her psychological make-up also influences the predic-
tor, thereby linking her choice to what is in the opaque box. Once it is clear that a player’s 
choice and what is in the box are dependent, the rational choice is to choose one box, since 
that is how the $1M gets in the box. The predictor mediates between the player’s internal 
states and the external situation.
7. A Useful Analogy
Consider an analogy. Golf instructors emphasize the importance of the follow-through 
swing to hit a golf ball correctly. However, watching professional golfers in slow motion, 
the ball is in flight before the follow-through portion of the swing occurs. How then, short 
of some strange backwards causation, can the follow-through influence the flight of the 
ball? The answer, of course, is that the initial portion of the swing is not independent of 
the follow-through; components of a swing cannot be performed in isolation from each 
other, so unless the swing is such as to end with a good follow-through, the club will not 
strike the ball properly. Human physiology may just be such that without a proper fol-
low-through it is not possible to hit a good golf shot. Similarly in the Newcomb Problem, 
given the stipulated conditions under which the predictor places a million dollars in the 
opaque box and the coherence constraint on a decision being rational, the only reliable way 
to get the million dollars in play is to be disposed to choose only the opaque box and to fol-
low through on that commitment. The entire process from interviewing with the oracle/
predictor Cassandra to choosing one or two boxes is a unit, like a golf swing, held together 
by a player’s rationality. And like the golf swing, the follow-through is an essential part of 
the process, for without it the player will not strike the predictor in the right way for her to 
place the $1,000,000 in the opaque box.
Now it might be objected that we are not appreciating the force of the fact that in the 
Newcomb scenario, taking both boxes is a dominant strategy. That is, no matter what the 
current state of the world is (i.e., whichever way Cassandra chose earlier), the expected 
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utility of two-boxing is higher than that of one-boxing. Setting utility equal to dollars, for 
simplicity, the utility of two-boxing if Cassandra put the money in the box is $1,001,000, 
vs $1,000,000 for one-boxing; and if she did not, it is $1000 vs $0. So no matter what we 
take the probability of her having placed the money in the box to be, the expected utility of 
two-boxing is higher than that of one-boxing, and by precisely $1,000. So, clearly, the only 
rational decision is to take both boxes.
To us, what this argument demonstrates is simply that a treatment of the problem 
that considers the in-game choice to be independent of the earlier interview leads to con-
tradictory results. Again the golf swing analogy is illuminating. Imagine a golfer who has 
over-stretched a shoulder muscle and is afraid of further damaging it—a likely outcome if 
she swings with a robust follow-through. Ceteris paribus what she would like to do is swing 
perfectly until the ball has left the club head, and then immediately stop putting effort into 
the swing, coming to a gentle halt with no over-extension. So our injured golfer should, it 
seems, stop putting any effort into her swing as soon as it passes the place where the ball lay 
(and hence has already hit and sent the ball on its way). It is the dominant strategy because 
the world could be one of two ways: If the ball has already been hit well, then there is no 
downside to abandoning the follow-through, and this has the advantage of avoiding risk of 
further injury. On the other hand if the ball has not been struck well at that point, a vigor-
ous follow-through is not going to help—the ball has left the club, after all! So the only ra-
tional thing to do is swing hard at first, and then abandon the follow-through come what 
may. It should be clear what will happen to this golfer: she’ll hit bad shot after bad shot, 
and go home scratching her head about where decision theory led her astray. The problem, 
again, was in taking the follow-through to be independent of the first half of the swing: be-
cause it is not, one has to view the whole swing as one decision-act in order for the theory 
to not lead one astray.
8. Further Considerations: Backtracking
We admit that our analysis will seem counterintuitive to some, so let’s look at it more 
closely. We are denying that if a participant who chose one box and received $1,000,000 
had chosen two boxes she would have received $1,001,000 and that a player who chose 
two boxes and received $1,000 would have received nothing if she had chosen only one 
box; and the basis of our denial is her rationality.9 First consider a slightly modified case in 
which the predictor is perfect. Gibbard and Harper claim “The argument that the U-utility 
of taking both boxes exceeds that of taking only one box goes though unchanged” (1978, 
154).10 Intuitions divide here;11 the U-utility calculation depends on the above counter-
factual—namely, “What the agent knows for sure is this: if he took both boxes, he would 
get a thousand dollars more than he would if he took only the opaque box” (ibid)—which 
9 Our argument is not merely evidence based; the stipulated facts indicate to us that there is a causal 
connection between the decision and what is in the box because she is rational.
10 U- utility is Gibbard and Harper’s calculation of expected outcomes in which two-boxing always dom-
inates one-boxing.
11 (Ahmed 2015) discusses and rejects a discontinuity if prediction is perfect, that being the only case in 
which one-boxing is rational.
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in turn depends on the independence of what is in the box from the player’s decision. In 
the case in which the predictor is perfect, this assumption is manifestly unjustified. Under 
no circumstances can a participant receive $1,001,000. She either picks one box and wins 
$1,000,000 or two boxes and receives $1,000: guaranteed! So conceiving of the decision sit-
uation as one in which a million dollars either is or is not in the opaque box already, mak-
ing it rational to choose both boxes for maximum payout, is to misconceive the situation, 
highlighting the fact that the decision and what is in the opaque box are not independent. 
What is true counterfactually in the case of a stipulated perfect predictor is that had a per-
son who received a million dollars by choosing one box chosen two boxes, the opaque box 
would have been empty and she would have received $1,000. Likewise a person who gets 
$1,000 by choosing two boxes would have gotten $1,000,000, not $0, had she chosen just 
one box. The actual Newcomb case deviates from this case only slightly, when the predictor 
makes an error; so in the actual scenario too, apart from rare error cases, counterfactually if 
a person who chose one box and received $1,000,000 were to have chosen two boxes, she 
would have gotten $1,000.12 There simply is no reliable means to obtain $1,001,000. The 
maximum payout that can be reliably obtained is $1,000,000, so the rational strategy is to 
make $1,000,000 the goal and do what is required to obtain it.
Some diagnosis of the diverging intuitions may be helpful here. Standard analyses con-
sider whether the million dollars is in the opaque box or not, in isolation, and ask in that sit-
uation what will get the most money, with no consideration for how a participant influences 
the situation she is in. “We two-boxers think that whether the million already awaits us or 
not, we have no choice between taking it and leaving it” (Lewis 1981, 377). As advocates of 
the dominant strategy analyze the problem, the predictor is irrelevant.13 Indeed, their anal-
yses would apply equally if the participant fell ill just before airtime so her friend, who was 
not predicted, was sent in to play for her. In this substitute player scenario, the friend’s de-
cision really is independent of the process determining what is in the opaque box, so for her 
we agree it certainly is rational to take two boxes, hoping her friend was an unwavering one-
boxer. But the actual participant is not in these circumstances.14 Her rational psychological 
make-up determines both how she will be predicted and what she will choose. Her freedom 
to choose does not entail that her choice is independent of her past, and indeed it cannot be 
if she is rational.15 If a participant’s psychological make-up is such that she will not follow 
through in choosing only box A at the time of the decision, she will not strike Cassandra in 
the right way, who in turn will not place the $1,000,000 in the opaque box.
Another possible concern with our analysis is that we explicitly endorse what Lewis 
(1979) calls a backtracking counterfactual. We are taking it as true that had a person who 
chose one box and received $1,000,000 chosen two boxes she would have received only 
$1,000. Our reasoning is that because she is rational her choice and what’s in the box are 
12 Our reasoning here is in agreement with Horgan’s (1981).
13 The case parallels the Monty Hall Problem in that ignoring how the circumstances arise leaves out es-
sential information for calculating the correct expected utility.
14 We see it as a virtue of our account that it clearly distinguishes what we take to be different scenarios 
that receive the same treatment on standard analyses.
15 Fischer (2001) argues for the dominant strategy in response to Carlson (1998) on the grounds that 
our free choice is constrained by the actual past; however, his reasoning still requires the choice and 
prediction to be independent, which we deny for any rational agent. (See footnote 7).
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not independent, so in order for her to counterfactually choose two boxes the causal ante-
cedents would have to be different in ways that would also affect the predictor and hence 
what is in the opaque box. Lewis acknowledges that in special circumstances marked by 
their own peculiar grammar (“what would have had to have been the case such that…”) 
backtracking counterfactuals are appropriate, but says we default back to standard contexts 
in which counterfactual dependence is asymmetric, the past being independent of the fu-
ture. “Under this standard resolution, back-tracking arguments are mistaken: if the present 
were different the past would be the same, but the same past causes would fail somehow to 
cause the same present effects” (Lewis 1979, 457).
Lewis reasons that the nearest possible worlds are ones in which, from our point of 
view, small miracles, or violations of scientific laws, occur just before the critical moment 
in question, so that the past remains constant. “The deterministic laws of w0 are violated 
at w1 in some simple, localized, inconspicuous way. A tiny miracle takes place” (468). By 
contrast, backtracking counterfactuals of the sort we endorse require significantly more 
change, possibly reaching back to the origins of the universe. “But, under the backtracking 
resolution, the being’s predictive correctness is a more important parameter of similarity 
than is maximization of the spatiotemporal region through which perfect match of particu-
lar fact prevails” (Horgan 1981, 336-7). Whatever the general account of counterfactuals 
may be, Lewis’s account does not correctly capture the situation in the Newcomb Problem. 
Recall, the counterfactual in question is that were someone who took one box and won 
a million dollars to have taken two boxes, she would have won an extra thousand dollars. 
So the tiny miracle that Lewis describes, taken in the context of the Newcomb Problem, 
would change a committed one-boxer into a two-boxer at the last instant. Such a change 
would make her decision inconsistent with her own psychological history, which causes her 
actual choice, hence irrational. Furthermore, Lewis’s analysis of the counterfactual leads to 
the following dilemma, anticipated by Horgan (1981). The small change either affects the 
predictor or it does not. If the change does not affect the predictor, she will make the same 
prediction as in the actual case, which will now be incorrect, contrary to the stipulated suc-
cess rate of the predictor (see section 4 above). If, on the other hand, the prediction were 
to change along with the choice, the opaque box would be empty, as we claim. Either way, 
Lewis’s account of the counterfactuals cannot be correct in the Newcomb scenario. “I 
think that Evidentialists typically concede too much to their Causalist opponents, in grant-
ing them the counterfactuals on which the charge that one-boxing is irrational always de-
pends” (Price 2012, 507).
Several authors (Ahmed 2014, Fischer 2001, Vinci 1988) argue that backtracking coun-
terfactuals are not relevant for deciding the Newcomb Problem, though they do not agree 
about the resolution. Others (Cantwell 2013, Hunter and Richter 1978) highlight the im-
portance of how the problem is represented and the context sensitivity in interpreting coun-
terfactuals. Indeed, from a semantic point of view, standard (fixed past) and backtracking 
counterfactuals are both legitimate uses of counterfactual conditionals. However, as Dum-
mett (1993) points out, the Lewis-style interpretation is appropriate use of language after a 
decision is made and not a guide as to what it is rational to do. (Note, Dummett stipulates 
the possible contents of the opaque box as $10,000 rather than $1,000,000):
After I have done it [chosen one box], the rules governing the assertion of counterfactual con-
ditionals may entitle me to assert, “If I had taken both boxes I should have got $11,000”; but that 
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is only a remark about our use of counterfactual conditionals. Before I make my choice I should 
be a fool to disregard the high probability of the statement, “If I take both boxes, I shall get only 
$1,000”. That is not merely a remark about our use of the word “probability”, nor even about our 
use of the word “rational”, but about what it is rational to do (Dummett 1993, 375, emphasis in 
original).
9. Spohn’s Analysis: Common Cause
As we analyze the problem, a person’s prior psychological state is a common cause of both 
what is in the opaque box and how she will choose, linking them. Interestingly, Nozick, in 
his concluding footnote, recognizes that such a common cause may play a role in explaining 
Newcomb’s Problem.
But it also seems relevant that in Newcomb’s example not only is the action referred to in the 
explanation of which state obtains (though in a nonextensional belief context), but also there is 
another explanatory tie between the action and the state; namely, that both the state’s obtaining, 
and your actually performing the action are both partly explained in terms of some third thing 
(your being in a certain initial state earlier). A fuller investigation would have to pursue yet more 
complicated examples which incorporated this (Nozick 1969, 146, note 22).
Wolfgang Spohn (2012) offers a defense of one-boxing in which the common cause is the 
decision itself, which takes place at the time of the interview. We are broadly sympathetic 
to his analysis and agree with the strategy he prescribes. He does express some reservations 
at artificially placing the decision at the time of the interview. “Being committed or decided 
all along without ever having reflected on the matter? This sounds strange, and this may be 
the weak part of my account of NP, but, as I would insist then, the only weak part” (Spohn 
2012, 103). To relieve this tension we suggest that it is more appropriate to speak of a deci-
sion process rather than a decision as a momentary event. As Spohn recognizes, what holds 
this complex causal nexus together is the participant’s rationality. “You are decided early 
enough to one-box, simply by being rational, and this influences the predictor’s predic-
tion, presumably simply by his observation of your consistent and continuous rationality” 
(ibid.). His reason for putting the decision at the time of the interview is to block a screen-
ing off effect of any earlier common cause by a participant’s self-awareness of her intention 
to one or two-box.16 However, the consistency and continuity of a rational decision process 
do not admit such a break. The process is a unit, like a golf swing, so placement of the de-
cision at any point within the decision process is an artificial stipulation.17, 18 Nothing rules 
16 See (Eells 1982) for detailed discussion. For detailed discussion about when one can hold credences 
about what one will do see (Hájek 2016).
17 Similarities between our reasoning here and Dennett’s account of consciousness are not accidental.
18 Our analysis may seem too restrictive to accommodate variations of the problem, such as when the 
prediction is made in the remote past. Our suspicion is that such scenarios are designed to press the in-
tuition that the decision and prediction, hence what is in box A, are independent. However, we main-
tain that even when the prediction is in the remote past, the predictor is sensitive to a causal chain that 
culminates in the final decision, though, of course, only the smallest part at the very end of the chain 
will correspond to intentional states in the player’s decision process. The common cause occurs in the 
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out that a participant might reflect about what to do after the interview, possibly chang-
ing her mind several times. Indeed, this is to be expected in problem scenarios that generate 
paradoxes through reflective self-reference, such as the Newcomb Problem. Thus a friendly 
amendment to Spohn’s formalism, suggested by a correct understanding of rationality and 
its role of binding events into a decision process, is to re-interpret his common cause as the 
first stage of the decision process culminating in the act of taking one or two boxes. This 
amendment removes any artificiality in Spohn’s analysis and is consistent with his own ra-
tionale for placing the decision at the beginning of the process. “…your introspection will 
reveal that often your reflection does not issue in a decision, but rather finds that you were 
already decided or committed” (ibid.). With this amendment our account and Spohn’s are 
in agreement.
10. Clarifications
Note that we are not defending an evidence-based decision theory per se. Rather, the ev-
idence indicates that there is a causal relation to be explained and puts constraints on 
what that explanation might be. As a result, the correct expected utility calculation in the 
 Newcomb situation is more complex than what the objector imagines; it involves a de-
cision process that takes place over (at least) the interval from when the game first be-
gins until the final choice is reported, in which seemingly independent events are linked 
by a common cause. The causal decision theory (CDT) analysis goes wrong in treating 
the process as a single event occurring only at the last moment.19 Of course, the player 
will find herself in the moment of truth. The opportunity to influence the predictor 
is gone and she has to decide what to do at that very moment, not lament about what 
she wishes she had done. The ideal course of action for playing the game is to somehow 
convince Cassandra that you will choose one box but actually choose two. The trouble 
with this course of action is that although we do not know her means, Cassandra is rarely 
fooled. And as the Newcomb Problem is standardly set up, this success is not a contin-
gent fact about strategies that participants happen to have used. Even convincing yourself 
that you will be a one-boxer won’t be enough. Consider the second-guessing-one-boxer, 
who convinces herself that she will choose one box. Having done so, at the moment she 
chooses she reasons that since she herself was convinced she would choose one box, Cas-
sandra must have been similarly convinced and put the $1,000,000 in box A. But as with 
all other strategies this will have telltale signs that the participant will choose two boxes in 
remote past in that, foreseeing the causal chain, the predictor links the contents of box A to the final 
choice. If this seems farfetched, note that the scenario already requires supposing a predictor in the re-
mote past who can predict that such a game will be played at a particular time and location in the dis-
tant future, based only on her observations in the remote past. In such a case supposing she can also 
predict the choice to be played does not seem so fanciful after all.
19 It seems to be the reflexive nature of the decision, which depends on reasoning about the prediction of 
that very decision that generates the paradox. In such cases, we prescribe Spohn’s (2012) formalism, in-
terpreted as a decision process, to model the situation. Other cases, especially those involving common 
causes, may also require treating decisions as processes, but a general analysis of when to do so is be-
yond the scope of this paper.
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the end, so even if everyone adopted this second-guessing-one-boxer strategy, Cassandra 
still would be 99% accurate. A last minute change of heart will be predictable and box A 
will be empty. The upshot is that in the final instant, a player must realize that whatever 
she does next will follow from a process that left telltale signs the predictor used to deter-
mine what is in the box, making it rational to choose only one box. The player (and we) 
does not know herself how her psychological states cohere with her decision, only that 
they do. But the predictor knows us better than we know ourselves. A player making the 
rational choice exploits that fact to make it likely20 the predictor put the $1M in box A; 
the $1,000 is a seductive trap that must be avoided.
Suppose the game were varied so that players could simply take $1,000,000 from box 
A and go home or first take $1,000 from box B and then open box A, with the catch that 
box B’s lid was hooked up (in advance and preset) to a mechanism that 99% of the time 
released a trap door so the million dollars in box A would drop away and be lost. We sus-
pect that very few two-boxers would be tempted by the $1,000 in this trap-door variation, 
even if the mechanism was preset based on a reliable prediction of what the player would 
choose; yet the actual Newcomb situation is much closer to this scenario than the way 
two-boxers analyze it, as a choice of one or two boxes whose content is already set. The 
game begins at the interview and proceeds through a complicated causal decision nexus 
captured in Spohn’s (2012) common cause model. Two-boxers lament that they “were 
never given any choice about whether to have a million” (Lewis 1981, 377). They find 
fault with the game for rewarding irrationality. “We take the moral of the paradox to be 
something else: If someone is very good at predicting behavior and rewards predicted ir-
rationality richly; then irrationality will be richly rewarded” (Gibbard and Harper 1978, 
153). Our response is roughly that in a situation in which CDT-irrationality is richly re-
warded the rational thing to do is act CDT-irrationally. “Any policy compliance with 
which has a strong possibility of not yielding the greatest advantage simply cannot be that 
which a rational agent will adopt” (Dummett 1993, 375). Less roughly, given the goal of 
getting as much money as possible, one should do whatever will reliably get you the most 
money; and that is the rational course of action, even in decision theoretic terms. Thus, in 
the Newcomb Problem the rational action is committing to taking one box at the outset 
and following through on that commitment. A player’s final choice does not cause there 
to be a million dollars in the box nor make her the type of person who (earlier) strikes 
the predictor as a one-boxer or a two-boxer. It reveals her nature, possibly even to herself, 
though not, of course, to the predictor.21 Can she resist low-hanging fruit? The game re-
wards disciplined rationality.
20 Essentially, knowing there is a common cause of what is in box A and her decision, a rational player 
picks one box and trusts the predictor got it right. The probability of the predictor’s success is relevant 
insofar as it is the basis of that trust.
21 Nozick makes an even stronger claim. “Although performing an action of the sort that would be done 
by a certain kind of person may not cause the agent to be this kind of person, it may symbolize his be-
ing that way, be some evidence that he is, and have the causal consequence of making it easier for him 
to maintain an image of himself as being of that kind. This last is a real causal consequence of an action 
and may have significant utility” (Nozick 1993, 49, emphasis in original).
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11. The Look-First Scenario
We conclude with one final variation that Gibbard and Harper presented with the inten-
tion of highlighting that the original Newcomb game rewards irrationality. In this new 
look-first scenario, after the same prediction process one is allowed to look in the opaque 
box and then decide whether to take the $1,000. Since, on a sequential decision-theoretic 
analysis there is no apparent cost for the one-boxer after the fact to take the extra thousand 
dollars, it seems the rational strategy is to take the extra $1,000 after finding $1,000,000. 
Again the conclusion is compelling if one mistakenly assumes that taking the $1,000 af-
ter the fact is independent of earlier events; but in fact the scenario is inconsistent with the 
stipulated parameters of the Newcomb situation, highlighting the dependence of the two 
choices.
The two problems are importantly different. The look-first scenario admits four pos-
sible strategies, as opposed to the two strategies of one-boxing or two-boxing in the orig-
inal Newcomb Problem. In addition to the original two strategies, players might choose 
a strategy of reacting to what the predictor does. A player might choose to be a cooper-
ative responder, settling for the $1,000,000 if it is there, as a one-boxer would, but tak-
ing the $1,000 consolation if the million is not in box A, as a two-boxer would. Interest-
ingly, whether the million dollars is in box A or not, the predictor cannot be wrong about 
the cooperative responder, and so Cassandra gets to choose what this player will win. As-
suming her choice is random, half of the time cooperative responders win $1,000,000, 
the other half they settle for $1,000. The final strategy is the problematic one for this sce-
nario. A player can choose to be an uncooperative responder, or a defier. The defier does 
the opposite of how she is predicted to behave. If the million dollars is in box A, a predic-
tion of one-boxing, the defier takes both boxes getting $1,001,000. If box A is empty, a 
prediction of two-boxing, the defier, perhaps out of spite, takes nothing. So the predic-
tor can never be right about a defier, contrary to the stipulation that she must be correct 
99% of the time. Rather than showing that in the original Newcomb Problem two-boxing 
is the more rational strategy, the incoherence of this scenario makes manifest how crucial 
the stipulated success rate of Cassandra is for the correct analysis of the original Newcomb 
Problem—precisely what the defenders of two-boxing set aside as irrelevant.22
12. Conclusion
We have used Newcomb’s Problem to highlight an often-overlooked feature of rational 
decisions, namely that their rationality consists in cohering with a background of coher-
22 If further stipulations are added about the number of defiers to keep the predictors overall success rate 
very high and the predictor chooses at random in both responder scenarios since she is either guaran-
teed to be correct or incorrect, one-boxing is still the best strategy in the look-first scenario since it 
makes it most likely the $1,000,000 will be in play. Perhaps no one is so “hyper-rational” as to actually 
one-box in the look-first scenario, but overwhelmingly the alternative is to find box A empty. “When 
those who leave the thousand dollars are asked later why they do so, they say things like ‘If I were the 
sort of person who would take the thousand dollars in that situation, I wouldn’t be a millionaire’” 
(Gibbard and Harper 1978, 154). Just so, Socrates.
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ent psychological states. Decision-acts are like golf swings: the right way to think of them 
is as a unit, where the earlier parts of the action are simply not independent of the later 
parts, nor is the final upshot of the action (i.e. success or failure). A golfer can suddenly 
stop swinging hard an instant after the club strikes the ball, but she is fooling herself if she 
thinks that, in a case where she does that, the first half of the swing can be exactly the same 
as it would have been in a case where she intended all along to have a good follow-through 
and did so. Applied to the Newcomb Problem, this makes the rational strategy to choose 
one box. Analyses that determine two-boxing to be a dominant strategy ignore the role of 
the predictor that establishes non-mysterious causal connections via a common cause link-
ing the contents of the opaque box to what a player decides.23 “I do recommend acting as if 
one’s present choice could causally influence the being’s prior prediction, but my argument 
does not presuppose backward causation” (Horgan 1981, 340-341, emphasis in original). 
If what is in the opaque box were independent of the player’s choice then the best strategy 
would be to two-box; however, the player’s rationality guarantees they are not independ-
ent.
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